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DeMarco v. Stoddard: A Compulsory Liability Insurance State Burdens the Consumer

In 1998, the New Jersey legislature, joining numerous other states, instituted a
compulsory statute requiring medical professional liability insurance for podiatrists.1 N.J.S.A §
45:5-5.3 codifies the requirement, mandating that each podiatrist maintaining a professional
practice in New Jersey must be covered by at least a minimum amount of medical liability
coverage prescribed by the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners (BME).2 The BME then
established a regulation quantifying that minimum required amount of coverage at “$1 million
per occurrence and $3 million per policy year.”3 In the event that coverage is unavailable, the
physician may provide a letter of credit evidencing the minimum amount of funds to cover
liabilities.4
Similar to compulsory automobile insurance, medical professional liability insurance is
meant to insulate the negligent from catastrophic liability payouts while also protecting the
consumer from the negligent running out of personal funds.5
In 2015, a Supreme Court of New Jersey ruling established that a New Jersey health care
consumer can no longer passively rely on compulsory medical malpractice insurance statutes to
ensure recourse in the event of their medical practitioner’s negligence.6 In DeMarco v. Stoddard,
the Court held that an insolvent-podiatrist’s insurance company, though having received
premiums for over three years, would not be obligated to indemnify its previously-insured
podiatrist named in a malpractice claim because, upon notification of the claim, the insurance

1

DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363, 374 (2015).
N.J.S.A § 45:5-5.3
3
N.J.A.C §. 13:35–6.18.
4
Id.
5
See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Medical Professional Liability Insurance, (January 7,
2016), available at http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_med_mal.htm.
6
See DeMarco, 223 N.J. at 374.
2

company discovered that the podiatrist had misrepresented information in his application for
obtaining coverage.7 Even with its power to promulgate an equitable ruling, the Court has left an
injured victim with no choice but to file suit against the negligent podiatrist alone, he who has
defaulted on his student loans and holds a significant amount of additional debt.8
Currently, New Jersey’s compulsory medical liability insurance statute, though likely
unknown to most, promises protection for both the consumer and the practitioner; yet, DeMarco
seemingly turns that promise upside down and potentially forces a patient to re-think seeking any
medical help at all, even simple, routine preventative care.9 This Note will explore the decision
in DeMarco v. Stoddard. First, the Note will discuss the statutory background of New Jersey’s
compulsory liability insurance statute and the medical malpractice cause of action. This Note
will further discuss DeMarco v. Stoddard and its implications towards New Jersey’s compulsory
medical liability insurance statute. This Note will conclude by arguing that DeMarco v.
Stoddard, though arguably sound in legal analysis, should have been ruled with a more
appropriate, equitable result.

Part I: Medical Malpractice – a History
A. The Anatomy of the Medical Malpractice Cause of Action
Under one form or another, medical malpractice has occurred in the physician-patient
setting for centuries.10 Dating even as far back as 2030 B.C., the Hammurabi Code stated, “[i]f
the doctor has treated a gentleman with a lancet of bronze and has caused the gentleman to die,
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DeMarco, 223 N.J. at 374.
See id. at 369.
9
See id. 363.
10
See Melissa Patterson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: The Product of Insurance Companies and a Threat to
Women’s Health, QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 109, 112 (citing Melvin M. Belli, Sr., J.D., The Evolution of Medical
Malpractice Law, Legal Aspects of Medicine, 3 (J.R. Vevaina et al. eds., Springer Verlag 1989)).
8

or has opened the abscess of the eye of a gentleman with a bronze lancet, and has caused the loss
of the gentleman's eye, one shall cut off his hand.”11 Though dramatically stricter than the
present judicial methods in handling medical malpractice cases, it is clear that governing bodies
tend to have an interest in ensuring that the everyday medical consumer is at least minimally
protected by the practitioner’s potential for liability.
Medical malpractice arises as a cause of action in tort when a practitioner enters into a
physician-patient relationship, subsequently deviates from the professional standard of care, and
that deviation proximately causes the patient’s injury.12 Medical malpractice is the root of a
consistently present source of injury, damaging the lives of patients across the United States, and
for that matter, the planet. At first glance, it can be seemingly simple to understand: doctors are
humans; humans make mistakes. When accounting for intentional deviations from the standard
of care, it can seem even more plausible that medical malpractice may never be defeated.
Medical practitioners are aware when entering the profession that this has simply become a
factor of the job.13
The availability of a medical malpractice action in tort brings with it various positives
and negatives to the world of the consumer. On one hand, the practitioner is threatened with
liability in the absence of acting within the prescribed duty of care because each patient that
walks through the front door of the professional office has in his pocket the medical malpractice
cause of action.14 Understandably, when the body is involved, a patient expects nothing short of

11

Id.
See Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 23 (2004) (citing Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318 (1985); Clark v. Wichman,
72 N.J. Super. 486, 179 (App. Div. 1962); Germann v. Matriss, 55 N.J. 193 (1970)).
13
16 Am. Jur. Trials § 471 (1969).
14
See generally Alan Feigenbaum, Special Juries: Deterring Spurious Medical Malpractice Litigation in State
Courts, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1361, 1362 (2003).
12

perfection from his physician.15 In the event of even the slightest of unfavorable outcomes to the
patient, the threat of a lawsuit will forever be looming in the background.16
On the other hand, the availability of this cause of action provides the patient with the
ability to feel at ease with reliability when seeking medical treatment, knowing that recourse is
available if injured at the hands of a negligent practitioner.
Beginning in the 1970s, the size of jury verdicts awarded in successful medical
malpractice cases rose substantially.17 For example, “[the] average malpractice jury verdicts rose
from $50,000 and $125,000 in Chicago and San Francisco, respectively, in the 1960s, to
$600,000 and $450,000 in the 1970s, to $1.2 million in each city in the 1980s.”18 Economically,
where the potential for liability can stretch as far as the eye can see, a business is to be had in
providing coverage and indemnification from that liability. In comes medical malpractice
insurance.
Medical professional liability insurance, also known as “medical malpractice insurance”
is a type of professional liability insurance which, when purchased by a physician, releases the
physician from various amounts of liability “associated with wrongful practices resulting in
bodily injury, medical expenses and property damage, as well as the cost of defending lawsuits
related to such claims.”19 Premiums are paid by medical practitioners in exchange for an
insurance company’s contractually-bound duty to indemnify the practitioner from victims
seeking recourse.20 Procedurally, a medical practitioner will be named as a defendant to a
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See id. (citing Sheila L. Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack: Liability of Lawyers for Instituting Unjustified
Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1008 (1977)).
16
Id.
17
Id. at 1366.
18
Id. (quoting Fulton Haight, Dr., Heal Thyself: Strong Medicine for Professional Woes, Legal Times, May 8, 1989,
at 25).
19
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Medical Professional Liability Insurance, (January 7, 2016),
available at http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_med_mal.htm.
20
Id.

medical malpractice cause of action.21 Subsequently, the practitioner will notify the insurance
company that there is a claim filed against him.22 At this point, the insurer will likely be named
in the lawsuit; however, most cases with merit tend to end in settlement.23 Though statistically
unlikely, if and when a medical practice case goes to trial, the litigation can last anywhere from
months to years.24 Though generally regarded as a much needed form of protection for both the
physician and the consumer, the existence of medical malpractice insurance has gone through
various crises since its creation.25
As previously mentioned, the ever present reality of a patient’s tendency to expect
nothing less than pristine medical results from their physician has been a prominent factor
resulting in a plethora of meritless cases flooding the court system.26 This ultimately kicked off
several major moments in healthcare that have collectively been referred to as the “Medical
Malpractice Crisis.”27
In the 1970s, known as the medical malpractice insurance “Crisis of Availability,” this
first moment of panic had begun when the insurance industry was plagued with an increasing
number of medical malpractice claims ultimately leading to the following historical moment of
crisis.28
Next, in the 1980s, known as the medical malpractice insurance “Crisis of Affordability,”
the tremendous amount of malpractice claims led to the insurance industry’s substantial increase
21

See id.
See id.
23
Zachary Matzo, The Trial Process in a Medical Malpractice Lawsuit: An Overview of Each Stage in a Typical
Medical Malpractice Lawsuit, available at http://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/medical-malpractice/trial-processlawsuit.html.
24
Id.
25
Paul J. Barringer, III, A New Prescription for America's Medical Liability System, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y
235, 237 (2006).
26
See Alan Feigenbaum, Special Juries: Deterring Spurious Medical Malpractice Litigation in State Courts, 24
Cardozo L. Rev. 1361, 1362 (2003).
27
See id.
28
Id.
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in malpractice insurance premiums.29 This crisis forced physicians to “either cut down on risky
procedures or leave their practices altogether.”30
Following, in the late 1990s, an even sharper increase in premium rates occurred due to
the inclining frequency and severity of consumer claims coupled with the larger payouts awarded
from the judicial system.31
Today, theorists believe that the crisis has returned due to the wielding power of the
lawsuit.32 In an effort to curtail the crisis, various jurisdictions have called upon their legislatures
to employ various forms of tort reform.33 Generally, legislative efforts have “focus[ed] on
curtailing medical negligence claims by modifying access to the courts, shifting the costs and
burdens of litigation from the insurance and the medical industries to plaintiffs and their
attorneys, and modifying evidentiary and procedural requirements.”34 New Jersey, specifically,
has included N.J.S.A § 2A:53A-38 in the introduction to its statutory scheme, which embodies
various New Jersey legislative findings in reference to the medical malpractice insurance crisis.35
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Barringer, III, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y at 238.
Feigenbaum, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. at 1384; see also Carrie Lynn Vine, Addressing the Medical Malpractice
Insurance Crisis: Alternatives to Damage Caps, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 413 (2006) (citing Steven T. Masada,
Comment, Australia's “Most Extreme Case”: A New Alternative for U.S. Medical Malpractice Liability Reform,
13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 163, 164 (2002)).
31
Barringer, III, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y at 238-39.
32
See id.
33
Shirley Qual, A Survey of Medical Malpractice Tort Reform, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 417, 420-21 (1986)
(stating that from 1975 to 1976, every state legislature made some attempt at tort reform to curtail medical
malpractice claims. Whether these reforms had any effect on medical malpractice litigation or insurance costs is
debatable).
34
Id. (analyzing various tort reform approaches which tend to “cause medical malpractice lawsuits to be a more
complicated and burdensome procedure for the plaintiff, while implementing no procedure to regulate the insurance
industry or to reduce the incidence of malpractice.”).
35
N.J.S.A § 2A:53A-38.
a. One of the most vital interests of the State is to ensure that high-quality health care continues to be
available in this State and that the residents of this State continue to have access to a full spectrum of health
care providers, including highly trained physicians in all specialties;
b. The State's health care system and its residents' access to health care providers are threatened by a
dramatic escalation in medical malpractice liability insurance premiums, which is creating a crisis of
affordability in the purchase of necessary liability coverage for our health care providers;
c. One particularly alarming result of rising premiums is that there are increasing reports of doctors retiring
or moving to other states where insurance premiums are lower, dropping high-risk patients and procedures,
30

Though the various moments of crisis have tended to be instigated by increasing amounts
of medical malpractice litigation, there is still the growing amount of malpractice claims with
actual merit, calling upon more strenuous of consumer protection.36 One method of legislative
action has been through insurance regulation.37 New Jersey, for example, has favored protection
for the medical consumer by passing legislation requiring that medical practitioners obtain and
maintain at least a minimum amount of medical malpractice insurance coverage.38
B. Statutory Background
In 1998, the New Jersey legislature implemented its mandatory malpractice insurance for
podiatrists and physicians.39 This statute, and its 2004 accompanying regulation, mandates that,
in order to practice medicine in New Jersey, physicians and podiatrists must maintain at least a
minimum amount of malpractice insurance at $1 million per occurrence and $3 million per
policy year.40 Failure to comply with this requirement could result in disciplinary action and/or
various civil penalties, such as “revocation or suspension of the physician’s license to practice
medicine in this State.”41

and practicing defensive medicine in a manner that may significantly increase the cost of health care for all
our citizens
d. The reasons for the steep increases in the cost of medical malpractice liability insurance are complex and
involve issues related to: the State's tort liability system; the State's health care system, which includes
issues related to patient safety and medical error reporting; and the State's regulation and requirements
concerning medical malpractice liability insurers;
e. It is necessary and appropriate for the State to take meaningful and prompt action to address the various
interrelated aspects of these issues that are impacted by, or impact on, the State's health care system; and
f. To that end, this act provides for a comprehensive set of reforms affecting the State's tort liability system,
health care system and medical malpractice liability insurance carriers to ensure that health care services
continue to be available and accessible to residents of the State and to enhance patient safety at health care
facilities.
36
See generally Qual, n.j12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. at 417.
37
Id.
38
N.J.S.A § 45:9-19.17.
39
L. 1997, c. 365, § 1 (codified by N.J.S.A § 45:9-19.17); L. 1997, c. 365, § 2 (codified by N.J.S.A § 45:5–5.3).
40
N.J.S.A § 45:5–5.3; N.J.A.C §. 13:35–6.18.
41
Jarrell v. Kaul, 223 N.J. 294, 306 (2015) (citing N.J.S.A § 45:1–21).

Generally, N.J.S.A § 45:9 has been interpreted as “regulat[ing] the practice of medicine and
further requir[ing] physicians to undertake certain health-related tasks.”42 Unfortunately, there is
minimal legislative history as to the creation of N.J.S.A § 45:9-19.17 specifically; however, the
committee report evidences that the intent of the bill was to “ensure the citizens of the State that
they will have some recourse for adequate compensation in the event that a physician or
podiatrist is found responsible for acts of malpractice.”43

Part II: DeMarco v. Stoddard – A Change in Interpretation
The seemingly simple statutory mandate for medical malpractice insurance in New Jersey
was entrenched with a new layer of complexity, handed down by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in 2015.44 DeMarco v. Stoddard considered the issue as to “whether [a] Rhode Island
Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association (RIJUA) must defend and indemnify a
podiatrist in a medical malpractice action pending in New Jersey following rescission of the
podiatrist's medical malpractice liability policy.”45 The facts of the case embody a classic
situation of physician negligence leading to a medical malpractice lawsuit.
Defendant, Sean Robert Stoddard, D.P.M., practiced as a podiatrist at the Center for
Advanced Foot & Ankle Care, Inc., in New Jersey, which had offices located in both Toms River
and Lakewood, New Jersey.46 Further, Dr. Stoddard also maintained a podiatrist’s office in

42

Id. at 308.
Assembly Health Comm., Statement to S. 267 (Sept. 19, 1996).
44
DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363 (2015).
45
Id. at 366.
46
Id. at 367
43

Rhode Island.47 The trial court found Dr. Stoddard’s Rhode Island office to be an insignificant
portion of his medical business.48
In 2007, Dr. Stoddard applied for medical malpractice liability insurance through the
RIJUA, a Rhode Island insurance company.49 Dr. Stoddard specified within the application that
he was “licensed to practice podiatry in both Rhode Island and New Jersey, that his office
address was in Newport, Rhode Island, and that he was applying for affiliation with Newport
Hospital in Rhode Island.”50 Further, Dr. Stoddard listed his New Jersey office telephone number
on the application.51 The underwriting rules of the RIJUA required that, in order to obtain
medical malpractice insurance, the applicant must both be licensed to practice in Rhode Island
and that 51% or more of the physician’s medical practice occurs in Rhode Island.52 The
application contained a box for the applicant to confirm that at least 51% of the applicant’s
medical practice was generated in Rhode Island.53 Dr. Stoddard checked this box in affirmance.54
From 2007 to 2011, Dr. Stoddard honored his arrangement by paying monthly premiums
in exchange for the RIJUA’s contractual promise to indemnify in the event of a malpractice
lawsuit.55 From 2007 to 2009, Dr. Stoddard filed renewal applications each year to which he
included information identical to the inaugural application.56 In 2010, upon receipt of the year’s
renewal application, Dr. Stoddard listed the Lakewood, New Jersey, office address, as well as its

47

Id.
Id.; see also DeMarco v. Stoddard, 434 N.J. Super. 352, 362 (App. Div. 2014) appeal granted, 218 N.J. 270
(2014) and rev'd, 223 N.J. 363 (2015).
49
DeMarco 434 N.J. Super. at 361.
50
DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363, 367 (2015).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 393 (Albin, J., dissenting).
56
DeMarco v. Stoddard, 434 N.J. Super. 352, 361 (App. Div. 2014) appeal granted, 218 N.J. 270 (2014) and rev'd,
223 N.J. 363 (2015).
48

corresponding phone number within the application.57 Further, Dr. Stoddard repeatedly affirmed
the box on the application requesting acknowledgment that at least 51% of the physician’s
medical practice operated out of Rhode Island.58
From 2004 to 2011, Plaintiff, Thomas DeMarco, was under Dr. Stoddard’s care and
supervision for treatment related to Chronic Plantar Fasciitis.59 Typically, this illness involves
discomfort caused by “an inflammation of the tough, fibrous brand of tissue connecting the heel
bone to the base of the toes.”60 DeMarco was officially diagnosed with a split peroneal tendon.61
In response to this diagnosis, Dr. Stoddard performed three separate surgical procedures
throughout the duration of their medical relationship.62 The basis of DeMarco’s complaint is
formed from the circumstances of the September 2010 third and final surgery.63
In September, Dr. Stoddard performed the final foot surgery just before informing
DeMarco that he would be terminating his New Jersey practice in favor of moving to
California.64 Over the subsequent months, DeMarco’s foot condition grew worse and was forced
to undergo two additional surgeries from a separate physician.65 Subsequently, DeMarco filed a
medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Stoddard in New Jersey.66
The complaint alleged that “[Dr.] Stoddard had negligently performed the September
2010 foot surgery.”67 The complaint and summons were served to Dr. Stoddard in California

57

Id.
Id.
59
DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363, 367 (2015).
60
25 Westlaw Journal Professional Liability 7 (2016).
61
DeMarco, 223 N.J. at 367.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
DeMarco v. Stoddard, 434 N.J. Super. 352, 361 (App. Div. 2014) appeal granted, 218 N.J. 270 (2014) and rev'd,
223 N.J. 363 (2015).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
58

and, subsequently, forwarded to the RIJUA, per procedure.68 The RIJUA responded to the
documents with a reversion of rights letter stating, the “RIJUA only provides coverage for
physicians who maintain [51%] of their ‘professional time and efforts’ in Rhode Island” and that
the RIJUA was “in the process of securing facts concerning whether [Dr. Stoddard] ... met the
[51%] requirement for the provision of insurance coverage from the [RI]JUA.”69 At this point,
once the RIJUA had performed additional research after the complaint had been filed, the RIJUA
had rescinded its insurance policy on the basis that Dr. Stoddard had misrepresented that 51% of
his medical practice was operating within Rhode Island.70 Subsequently, the RIJUA refunded Dr.
Stoddard’s premiums paid for the period of March 2010 through January 2011.71 All previous
premiums were not returned to Dr. Stoddard.72
On March 9, 2012, DeMarco filed an amended complaint seeking a declaratory judgment
in New Jersey. 73 The amended complaint sought a ruling that the RIJUA must indemnify Dr.
Stoddard for the malpractice claim.74 Both the RIJUA and DeMarco filed cross-motions for
summary judgment seeking a ruling on whether “the RIJUA was required to defend and
indemnify Dr. Stoddard.”75 The RIJUA’s motion alleged that Dr. Stoddard had procured their
services through methods of misrepresentation, specifically, in falsely affirming the portion of
the application requiring at least 51% of the practitioner’s medical practice operating within

68

Id.
DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363, 368 (2015).
70
Id. at 386.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
DeMarco v. Stoddard, 434 N.J. Super. 352, 362 (App. Div. 2014) appeal granted, 218 N.J. 270 (2014) and rev'd,
223 N.J. 363 (2015).
74
Id.
75
DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363, 369 (2015). The case also includes an issue involving a choice of law
analysis. The trial court ruled that New Jersey law would govern; however, this issue will not be discussed in further
detail within this note.
69

Rhode Island.76 The trial court ruled in favor of DeMarco on both motions.77 The court held that,
even though Dr. Stoddard misrepresented facts on his application for insurance, “compulsory
insurance cannot be voided as to an innocent third party.”78
The RIJUA motioned the Appellate Division for leave to appeal.79 Upon considering the
legal issue as to “whether a medical malpractice insurance carrier may rescind a policy so that
the carrier has no duty to indemnify the insured doctor for injuries suffered by an innocent third
party who made a malpractice claim before the policy was rescinded,” the Appellate Division
affirmed the trial court’s ruling and held that the RIJUA was required to indemnify Dr.
Stoddard.80 The court stated,
“The rescission remedy available to an insurance carrier may preclude the insured doctor
from demanding coverage when he gave materially false information in his application
for insurance, but that remedy does not permit a malpractice policy to be voided from its
inception and in its entirety when an innocent patient seeks coverage.”81
Finally, the RIJUA motioned the Supreme Court of New Jersey for leave to appeal.82
The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.83 The Court held that the RIJUA owed no
duty to indemnify or defend Dr. Stoddard in the medical malpractice action.84

Part III: The Supreme Court of New Jersey Has Stifled the Medical Consumer

76

DeMarco, 434 N.J. Super. at 362.
Id. at 371.
78
Id.
79
DeMarco v. Stoddard, 434 N.J. Super. 352, 370 (App. Div. 2014) appeal granted, 218 N.J. 270 (2014) and rev'd,
223 N.J. 363 (2015).
80
Id. at 367.
81
Id. at 370 (citing Dillard v. Hertz Claim Mgmt., 277 N.J. Super. 448, 451 (App. Div. 1994) aff'd, 144 N.J. 326
(1996)).
82
DeMarco v. Stoddard, 218 N.J. 270 (2014).
83
DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363, 384 (2015).
84
Id.
77

In DeMarco, the Court turned its back on the medical consumer in reversing the
Appellate Division when interpreting New Jersey’s compulsory medical liability insurance
statute without implementing a more equitable ruling.85 With intensity, the Court acted swiftly in
disapproval when discussing the Appellate Division’s actions in analogizing compulsory medical
liability insurance with the present-day compulsory automobile liability insurance model, in
favor of comparing it rather to legal malpractice insurance and other forms of professional
liability insurance.86 In doing so, the Court stated, “[I]t is well established in this State that a
professional who has made a misrepresentation of material fact in an application for professional
liability insurance can expect that the policy may be rescinded on application of the insurer.”87
The majority’s ruling has significant meaning for this context, in particular, because of
the facts surrounding this case. The ruling effectively makes it nearly impossible for the injured
third-party to have the ability to obtain recourse from the judicial system.88 The defendantpodiatrist has been unsuccessful in his efforts to practice medicine in California and is still in
debt, recovering from student loan default.89 This ruling begs the question as to whether there is
a mandate that the everyday medical consumer must do an extensive background check on her
doctor in order to feel comfortable going in for medical treatment.

85

See id. at 363.
Id. at 366 (“We also conclude that the compulsory automobile insurance model has no relevance to the remedial
response to a fraudulently obtained policy of professional liability insurance and the effect of rescission on innocent
third parties.”)
87
Id. at 379. The issue on appeal is not whether or not the insurer had the right to rescind the policy. The Court
concluded that the insurer did have the right to rescind the contract.
“A misrepresentation makes a contract voidable if a party's manifestation of assent is induced by either a
fraudulent or a material misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is justified in relying,
the contract is voidable by the recipient. Susan Koehler Sullivan, David A. Ring, Recurring Issues in
Rescission Cases, 42 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 51, 52 (2006) (citing Section 164(1) of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts section 164(1)).
88
See generally DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363 (2015).
89
Id. at 369.
86

As Justice Albin’s dissent argues, the majority’s approach rests on reasoning that
completely contravenes New Jersey’s public policy.90 Justice Albin states, “The aim of the law is
to provide financial protection to every patient in the State.” With no existence of controlling
precedent on point supporting the majority’s position, the majority has left a consumer without
any real possibility in receiving adequate recourse, yet the insurance company has walked away
with a windfall in insurance premiums.91 The insurance company has been allowed to accept
insurance premiums, wait to be notified that there is a pending claim against one of its
“insureds,” and, subsequently, devote its resources to research if is a possible road out of its
obligation exists.92 Upon finding that road out, it may completely rescind its contract, without an
ounce of reprimand for failing to put in a good faith effort to ensure that this problem was
extinguished at the outset.
The DeMarco dissent, in agreeance with the trial court and Appellate Division, embodies
the theme that “every patient has a right to presume that his physician is in compliance with the
law.”93 As the DeMarco majority mentioned, there has been miniscule amounts of case law
interpreting compulsory liability insurance statutes specific to physicians and podiatrists required
to maintain medical malpractice liability insurance.94 In New Jersey alone, there has only been
one other case addressing the issue as to the consequences to an injured third party when a
medical malpractice liability insurance policy has been rescinded by the insurer, including this
case under discussion; however, the case does not discuss the present issue.95

90

Id. at 385 (Albin, J., dissenting).
Id. at 389. (Albin, J., dissenting). Justice Albin states, “the RIJUA in this case has reaped a windfall—it pocketed
three years of premiums, backdated a rescission, and is not required to expend a single dollar of collected premiums
to compensate the innocent patient and his wife victimized by Dr. Stoddard's alleged medical malpractice.”
92
See generally DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 363 (2015).
93
Id. at 384. (Albin, J., dissenting).
94
Id. at 375.
95
Id. (citing Jarrell v. Kaul, 223 N.J. 294, 297 (2015)).
91

When there is an absence of controlling precedent, courts typically look to other areas of
reasonably similar situations in order to respect the intent of the legislature.96 Therefore, the
Court chose to analyze various other forms of compulsory liability insurance schemes and how
various court interpretations as influential in its decision-making process.97
Though insufficient case law on point, the case law interpreting various other compulsory
insurance statutes have drawn a distinctions between “the party who procures an insurance
policy through misrepresentations and the innocent party who plays no role in a fraud on the
insurer and is a victim falling within the coverage protections of the insurance policy.”98 Fisher
explains, “The insurance carrier's liability to its [in]sured who may be guilty of some act or
conduct which renders a policy void ab initio is therefore distinct from its liability to an injured
third person.”99 Thus, “an insurer cannot, on the ground of fraud or misrepresentations relating to
the inception of the policy, retrospectively avoid coverage under a compulsory or financial
responsibility insurance law so as to escape liability to a third party.”100

A. Protecting the Party Who Plays No Role in a Fraud in the Absence of Controlling
Precedent
In recognition of an absence of any controlling precedent, the DeMarco Appellate Division
began its plunge into similar areas of the law analysis by comparing the New Jersey compulsory
medical liability insurance statute with the similarly applicable compulsory automobile insurance

96

See DeMarco v. Stoddard, 434 N.J. Super. 352, 367 (App. Div. 2014) appeal granted, 218 N.J. 270 (2014) and
rev'd, 223 N.J. 363 (2015).
97
Id.
98
DeMarco v. Stoddard, 223 N.J. 388 (2015) (Albin, J., dissenting) (citing Fisher v. N.J. Auto. Full Ins.
Underwriting Ass'n, 224 N.J. Super. 552, 557 (App. Div. 1988)).
99
Fisher, 224 N.J. Super at 558.
100
Id.

statute and legal malpractice insurance statutes.101 With an understanding that there are no
directly relevant cases on point to decide this issue, the Appellate Division seemed to take a
presumption that New Jersey would seek to protect the interests of innocent third parties.102

1. Compulsory Automobile Insurance Statutes
The New Jersey legislature implemented N.J.S.A § 39:6A-3, a compulsory automobile
insurance coverage statute, which requires that every owner of an automobile in New Jersey
must maintain a minimum amount of automobile liability insurance coverage.103 This statutory
requirement for automobile insurance was “designed to ensure that the persons injured in motor
vehicle accidents are compensated promptly for their injuries and financial losses by immediate
recourse to insurance or public funds.”104 In various states where no statutory requirement exists,
one can imagine a scenario all too often occurring in which a driver, through no fault of her own,
is hit by an uninsured or underinsured motorist. The innocent driver’s ability for recovery is at
the mercy of the chance that this faulty driver actually has funds to cover the losses. The New
Jersey requirement ensures that all drivers will be covered by insurance in efforts to prevent this
injustice from continuing to occur.105
In the case of compulsory automobile insurance, New Jersey courts have generally concluded
that “the rescission remedy available to insurance carriers when a policy was procured by means
of a material misrepresentation may not infringe upon the rights of innocent third parties who
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might need to rely on insurance coverage to compensate them for their injuries.”106 Essentially,
the courts have ruled in favor of the innocent consumer.107 For example, in Marotta, the court
held that a driver has the “right to expect that all other drivers will be insured to the extent
required by compulsory insurance.”108
In Fisher v. New Jersey Auto, Thomas Lafferty applied for automobile insurance through
New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance Underwriting Association.109 Within the application,
Lafferty was requested to list the various vehicles that were registered under his name, along
with their accompanying Vehicle Identification Number and license plate number.110 Lafferty
was quickly approved for insurance.111 One month later, Plaintiff, a passenger in the Lafferty
vehicle, was injured in a collision with another automobile.112 Plaintiff did not have automobile
insurance coverage in her household so she applied for benefits through the policy issued to
Lafferty.113 After the insurer researched the claim, Lafferty was notified that his policy was
deemed void ab initio due to his “[failure] to register his vehicle as required by N.J.S.A §
17:30E-3m in order to be considered a qualified applicant under the plan.”114 Subsequently, the
premiums were returned and Plaintiff’s claim for benefits was denied.115 Plaintiff brought suit
against the insurance company claiming that, as an injured third-party, “she should not have been
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precluded from claiming PIP benefits under the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act
… simply because Lafferty-the insured-failed to meet the eligibility requirements set forth in
N.J.S.A § 17:30E-3m.”116 The court held, “even though Lafferty's misrepresentations may have
rendered the insurance policy void ab initio as to him, we hold that Hanover cannot now avoid
liability to plaintiff for PIP coverage by declaring the insurance policy null and void after the
accident.”117
Fisher can almost be seen as a parallel universe of relationships to the present case between
the podiatrist and the patient. Here, Dr. Stoddard was required by statute to obtain medical
liability insurance.118 Similarly, the driver in Fisher was required to obtain automobile
insurance.119 Both parties in each case had made material representations on their applications
for insurance, which allowed the insurer to rescind the policy.120 Further, both instances involved
an innocent third party becoming injured.121 Though factually similar, Fisher and DeMarco
arrived at different conclusions.122 Fisher, on the one hand, employed the widely held approach
that, “an insurer cannot, on the ground of fraud or misrepresentations relating to the inception of
the policy, retrospectively avoid coverage under a compulsory or financial responsibility
insurance law so as to escape liability to a third party.”123 DeMarco, following no precedent on
point, ruled in favor of allowing the insurer to avoid coverage. 124
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The DeMarco majority attempted to analyze the compulsory automobile insurance line of
cases from the present situation, ultimately stating, “The compulsory automobile insurance
model has no relevance to the remedial response to a fraudulently obtained policy of professional
liability insurance and the effect of rescission on innocent third parties.”125 The majority attempts
to bolster its argument by distinguishing the compulsory automobile liability insurance model
with the medical liability insurance model by claiming that the former has “created an
expectation among those operating motor vehicles that every individual who may be in an
accident will be insured.”126 Does New Jersey’s compulsory medical liability insurance statute
not create this expectation as well? As referred to in Part I, the intent of the legislature when
creating the medical liability insurance requirement was to “ensure the citizens of the State that
they will have some recourse for adequate compensation in the event that a physician or
podiatrist is found responsible for acts of malpractice.”127 This statute should allow the patientconsumer to have the presumption that all physicians in New Jersey will be insured. The
DeMarco majority seems to think otherwise.128
Disqualifying the compulsory automobile insurance model from influence, the DeMarco
majority follows by analyzing interpretations of the compulsory legal malpractice statutes for
guidance in its decision.129

2. Compulsory Legal Malpractice Statutes
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In 1997, the New Jersey legislature established N.J.S.A § 14A:17-1.130 This statute mandates
that lawyers who choose to organize in professional corporations or limited liability partnerships
must purchase and maintain legal malpractice insurance.131 In comparing this type of compulsory
insurance statute, it is key to note that, unlike automobile insurance and medical malpractice
insurance, New Jersey does not require that all who enter the legal field obtain legal malpractice
insurance.132 Regardless of that point, New Jersey courts have adjudicated various cases
involving those lawyers qualifying to be required to obtain legal malpractice insurance. Similar
to the cases interpreting compulsory automobile insurance, a distinction has been drawn in this
setting between “the insured as the wrongdoer and an innocent third party.”133
In First American Title Insurance Co. v. Lawson, a three-member law firm was established
as a Limited Liability Company in New Jersey.134 While the third member, Snyder, remained
innocent and unaware, the other two, Lawson and Wheeler, had been involved in a kiting
scheme.135 Lawson had discovered that the other culprit, Wheeler, had been “transferring money
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improperly from various client accounts … into other client accounts and into the firm’s business
account.”136 Upon confronting Wheeler, Lawson decided to go along with the scheme.137
Upon receiving three grievances regarding the firm’s handling of certain transactions, the
Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) conducted an audit of the firm’s books which ultimately
resulted in the disbarment of Lawson and various claims from victims of the scheme.138 Once
named as defendants in the various claims, the firm notified its insurer.139
The firm had maintained the statutorily required minimum amount of legal malpractice
insurance; however, the insurance company sought to release itself from the obligation to
indemnify based on the argument that the firm’s managing partner had knowingly made material
misrepresentations when he applied for the insurance.140 The material misrepresentation referred
to involves a warranty statement signed by Wheeler.141 The warranty specifically asked, “After
inquiry, is any attorney in your firm aware of: … B. Any acts, error or omissions in professional
services that may reasonably be expected to be the basis of a professional liability claim?”142
Wheeler checked the box marked “NO” and subsequently signed the warranty statement
asserting to the insurer that the information on the application was accurate.143
The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision with respect
to releasing the insurer from the obligation to indemnify with respect to the two wrongdoers;
however, not with respect to the firm’s innocent third-party member.144 In a decision based on
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equitable principles and public policy, the court reasoned that “rescinding the policy as to the
innocent member was inconsistent with the public policy of protecting consumers of legal
services with malpractice insurance.”145
Though the court ruled in favor of the innocent third-party, the DeMarco majority attempts to
use its decision in Lawson to bolster its current decision, interpreting that the rule in Lawson as,
“Upon rescission, the insurer owes no duty to defend or indemnify the law firm or any
defalcating attorney of the firm for any complaints pending or claims that accrued at the time of
rescission.”146 However, because the majority decided to let the innocent third member of the
firm continue to claim coverage from the insurer, Lawson stands for the position that a balancing
of equities is the appropriate measure in analyzing this type of issue.147 Rather than a governing
rule to deny insurance coverage to the innocent patient, the DeMarco majority should have
interpreted Lawson as requiring the court to balance the equities in a totality of the circumstances
approach based on public policy.
While it may be only two members of the dissent of which agree with the Appellate
Division’s decision to use a more equitable approach with a balancing of equities, this approach
is the proper one that should have been used to influence the majority’s decision.148 The New
Jersey courts have never adjudicated this issue with relation to compulsory medical malpractice
insurance statutes.149 Instead of deciding to consider other factors in a broad scope analysis, the
majority attempted to scurry up what it could do to make stretching arguments by analogizing
this statute to how courts have interpreted “similar” statutes.150 Even though the courts have
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frequently interpreted compulsory statutes as being protective of the innocent third-party, the
Court failed to approach the issue with a balancing of the equities. Had the Court done so in this
fashion, not only would the innocent third party would be adequately protected from what he
never could have anticipated, but the Court could have, at the outset, left it to the legislature to
come up with a fix for this problem of discrepancy as to whether an innocent third-party should
suffer based on the physician’s actions.
Even though both Fisher and Lawson act as persuasive authority in influencing the majority
to rule in favor of the innocent third-party, neither of the cases involve the compulsory medical
malpractice insurance statutes. At this point, the Court would have been correct to rule in favor
of the innocent third party as a matter of public policy.

3. Public Policy
The DeMarco majority, ruling in favor of the insurance company, concluded by stating, “We
have not identified any sound reason to treat medical professionals any differently than other
similarly situated professionals.”151 Strangely enough, other similarly situated professionals, as
in Lawson, have been afforded with an analysis into public policy where there is an absence of
precedent directly on point to help decide the issue.152 The DeMarco majority should have
followed up their similar statutory analysis with an analysis into public policy before making its
conclusion.
Public policy has been argued to influence the resolution of every single legal dispute. 153
Though fairly difficult to implement a black letter ruling on exactly what is meant by “public
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policy,” courts have regularly posited, “When we speak of public policy, ‘we mean the law of
the state, whether found in the Constitution, the statutes, or judicial records.’”154
As the DeMarco dissent states, “The approach taken by the majority is at complete odds
with our State’s public policy, which finds expression in our compulsory medical malpractice
insurance law. The aim of the law is to provide financial protection to every patient in the
State.”155 However, there also is said to be a public policy of the State to discourage fraudulent
conduct against an insurer.156 When comparing the public policy of the State, the Court would
have been appropriate to use a balancing of the equities approach in deciding which decision
would have better yielded less contravention to public policy.
Balancing the equities is a term of art, which, procedurally, is used to describe a weighing
game that courts undertake typically in cases where there is no precedent directly on point, to
weigh, based on the totality of the circumstances, any harms each side to a controversy would
suffer in the absence of relief from the courts.157 This process allows the courts to see, from a
bird’s eye view, exactly who and what the policy implications would effect given all potential
outcomes from a case.158
In a balancing the equities approach, the Court would have taken into account the public
policy concerns that have been alluded to through the DeMarco decision. On the one hand, New
Jersey’s public policy hopes to provide financial protection from every patient in the State.159 On
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the other hand, New Jersey acts against any kind of condoning of fraudulent activity against an
insurer.160
When considering both sides in a totality of the circumstances, the Court should have
unmistakably concluded that the innocent third party would be more severely injured by an
unfavorable decision with less contravention to public policy, as opposed to the insurance
company, which was in the best position to have uncovered Dr. Stoddard’s misrepresentation
well in advance of the third party’s injury.161 The dissent states, “The RIJUA was in the best
position to ferret out any misrepresentation made by Dr. Stoddard when he applied and reapplied
for malpractice insurance coverage. The innocent patient was in no position to do so.”162

Part IV: Conclusion
It is no longer safe to assume that obtaining medical care is the smartest thing that you can do
for your body. It is evident that the decision in DeMarco v. Stoddard turned the consumer’s
market for medical treatment on its head. As in New Jersey, compulsory medical liability
insurance statutes were meant to ensure that patients were given financial protection in the case
of a negligent physician. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has ruled that, even where medical
liability insurance is required by statute, the consumer cannot always rely on the courts to ensure
that the patient will receive the recourse they are promised in a situation of a physician’s
misrepresentation to his insurance provider.
This issue was well deserving of an analysis into the public policy of New Jersey, which
ultimately would have led to a balancing of the equities. Unfortunately, it is now left to the
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discretion of the legislature to ensure that the decision will not have adverse effects on the
medical community. The legislature should act quickly to ensure that a situation like this does
not happen again by implementing various safeguards to ensure that courts interpret the
compulsory liability statute in line with their clear intent in creating the statute.

